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Abstract
Utility-scale renewable electricity generation is essential to decarbonisation as well as to ensuring
affordable and secure electricity supplies around the world. Yet thus far there has been limited
critical thinking dedicated to the complexities behind the finance and ownership of this new
infrastructure and how national and local stakeholders should participate in and benefit from its
development, particularly in contexts of high inequality in low- and middle-income countries. As
the global renewable energy industry becomes increasingly consolidated and financialised, evi-
dence from a number of countries suggests that despite the pro-environmental outcomes of
utility-scale renewable electricity generation, the processes and institutions that procure and
finance it have often failed to include or benefit individuals and communities living in the national
and local vicinity. This paper therefore sets two key competing objectives of renewable electricity
generation in context: as a predictable, long-term revenue stream for investors, and as a mech-
anism for socio-economic development and community empowerment. Building on scholarship
from human geography, development studies and sustainability transitions, my analysis takes
forward understandings of the role of finance in utility-scale renewable electricity generation
as a key aspect of the political economy of the energy transition. In exploring the evolution of
renewable electricity as a new and rapidly emerging asset class I consider how its development is
increasingly determined by the frameworks and logics of finance and investment. Drawing on
examples from South Africa and Mexico, I address the following questions: What are the evolving
configurations and processes of finance and investment in utility-scale renewable electricity gen-
eration? How have they been facilitated? And what tensions have arisen from their implementa-
tion at the national and local level?
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Recent years have seen the rapid growth of electricity generation from renewable energy,
which by 2018 generated an estimated 13% of the world’s electricity (UNEP/BNEF, 2019:
20). Yet while renewable energy is essential to climate change mitigation as well as to
ensuring affordable and secure electricity supplies around the world (UNDESA, 2020),
there has been limited critical academic thinking dedicated to the complexities behind its
ownership. Similarly, there has been limited analysis into how national and local stake-
holders should participate in and benefit from its development, particularly in contexts of
socio-economic, political and spatial inequality in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs). As the global renewable energy industry becomes increasingly consolidated and
financialised, evidence from a number of countries suggests that despite the
pro-environmental outcomes of large-scale renewable energy projects, the mechanisms
and institutions that procure and finance it have often failed to adequately account for,
or benefit individuals and communities living in the national and local vicinity. Such a
failure has resulted in tensions and resistance by trade unions, local communities and
Indigenous peoples (Dunlap, 2018; Marais et al., 2017).
In this paper I focus on grid-connected, utility-scale renewable electricity generation. Of a
total of $272.9 billion of global renewable energy investment in 2018, 86.5% of it was for
utility-scale projects dominated by onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaics (PV),
and to a lesser extent, concentrated solar power and small-scale hydro (less than 50MW)1
(UNEP/BNEF, 2019: 38). A significant proportion of this generation has been procured
under renewable energy auctions, developed by independent power producers (IPPs) and
paid for by a complex interaction of public and private sources of finance and investment
under structures of project finance.
In keeping with the theme of this special issue on electricity capital (Luke and Huber, this
issue), I investigate two competing objectives of utility-scale renewable energy. The first,
embraced in particular by the finance industry, sees renewable electricity generation as a
predictable, long-term revenue stream for investors (BloombergNEF, 2020). The second, of
priority for non-governmental organisations, local communities, trade unions and some
local and national government departments, sees this development as a potential mechanism
for community empowerment and socio-economic development (Halsey et al., 2019). While
these two competing objectives represent tensions or even incompatibilities between global
processes of procurement and finance on the one hand and localised, territorial realities on
the other, thus far there has been limited in-depth, qualitative research dedicated to under-
standing them, particularly in contexts of high inequality in LMICs.
As I explore, South Africa and Mexico serve as poignant illustrations of how such
tensions have manifested in specific national and sub-national circumstances, and between
which there are significant points of comparison. Both are in the top 10 developing nations
for clean energy asset finance and regional leaders in renewable energy deployment in sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean respectively (BloombergNEF, 2020:
29). Both have undertaken regulatory reforms of their state-owned electricity sectors in
recent years in order to introduce auction programmes for the procurement of renewable
electricity generation from IPPs. While both countries are members of the G20 group of the
world’s largest emerging economies they also have high levels of socio-economic, political
and spatial inequality, which play a key part in the tensions inherent in utility-scale renew-
able electricity projects. Not least, because these projects require large tracts of land, in both
countries the most competitive resources are often located in remote and rural areas, of
which the majority populations are socio-economically and politically marginalised. As
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discussed below, evidence thus far suggests that these populations are the least likely to
benefit from these new developments.
Drawing on scholarship from human geography, development studies and sustainability
transitions, I take forward research on the political economy of the energy transition which
has identified tensions and trade-offs between the development of renewable energy infra-
structure on the one hand and the need to ensure equitable participation in the process and
distribution of the benefits on the other. However, this literature has yet to establish a
critical and in-depth knowledge base on the relationship between evolving modes of finance
and investment, and the socio-economic impacts of this infrastructure, including the extent
to which national and local actors are included in or excluded from such development.
There is therefore far greater scope to engage with renewable electricity as a new and rapidly
emerging asset class, including how its development and deployment is increasingly deter-
mined by the priorities and logics of finance and investment, particularly in contexts of
inequality, poverty and marginalisation.
In expanding on these themes, I offer a theoretical and empirical counterpoint to the
many techno-economic studies on energy finance which conceptualise finance as external to
the system rather than inextricably bound up with it. In so doing I seek to generate a critical
understanding of the complex and differentiated roles of public, private, national and inter-
national sources of finance and investment at play in utility-scale renewable energy projects.
Situating this infrastructure within the context of its inseparable and co-evolving relation-
ship with the finance that supports and shapes it, I ask the following overarching questions:
What are the evolving configurations and processes of finance and investment in utility-scale
renewable electricity generation? How have they been facilitated? And what tensions have
arisen from their implementation at the national and local level?
This paper draws from an extensive desk-based analysis of academic and grey literature,
including industry-specific publications such as Recharge News, Renewables Now, ESI-
Africa and Engineering News; company reports from the renewable energy industry; nation-
al policy and planning documents from South Africa and Mexico; reports and data by
international energy institutions such as IRENA, REN21, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD); and loan and investment data from development finance institutions and the
Bloomberg New Energy Finance database. My research is also informed by field work in
South Africa between 2015 and 2017 and participant observation at meetings and webinars
of industry and finance, including at the Africa Energy Forum in London 2015, the South
African Windaba in 2016, and the online Africa Utility Week in May 2020. Interviews are
not cited in the interests of participant and commercial confidentiality.
A methodological challenge to this research is that the landscape of renewable electricity
capital is one of a heterogeneous and constantly evolving set of actors, reflecting the com-
plex and shifting nature of transnational flows of finance and investment (Grimes and Sun,
2014). Indeed, beyond publicly available data from development finance institutions, it can
be difficult to access and disaggregate all of the actors and configurations of finance and
investment involved in utility-scale projects. Deals are not always disclosed, data may not be
complete and the various different ways in which money is being recycled in the sector is not
always captured (OECD/IEA, 2018). While this inevitably places restrictions on the anal-
ysis, such a reality also reflects one of the findings of this research, that the opaque and
shifting nature of project ownership can make attributing responsibility for it much harder.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section establishes the analytical fram-
ing on the role of finance in the energy transition. A later section provides a contextual
exploration of the global trends and processes for the procurement and finance of renewable
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electricity generation. This exploration includes the emergence of IPPs, the design of renew-
able energy auction programmes, the evolution of accompanying structures of project
finance and the determining influence of investor risk as a highly negotiated concept. The
penultimate section explores how these global processes have interacted with territorial
realities in South Africa and Mexico and their subsequent contribution to structural
inequalities and local conflicts. The final section concludes with a research agenda for
future thinking on this complex multi-scalar issue.
On the energy transition and the role of finance
Given the multi-faceted nature of electricity which, as a subset of energy, is at once a natural
resource, a technology, a networked infrastructure, a basic service and a financial asset, the
framing of this paper is necessarily inter-disciplinary. Mindful of broader questions of polit-
ical economy, power and politics in energy transitions which are by their nature messy, non-
linear and conflict-ridden (Baker et al., 2014; Bridge and Gailing, 2020), electricity can be
seen as a site of struggle, over its procurement, finance and ownership and the allocation of
its benefits, and interactions between incumbent configurations of political, social and eco-
nomic power and technological change (Gentle, 2009; McDonald, 2016). As I explore, this
struggle includes political resistance against renewable energy IPPs; social conflict between
local communities and Indigenous peoples, and institutions of the state, corporate entities
and flows of finance and investment; and movements of protest and resistance against new
forms of enclosure and land appropriation (Avila-Calero, 2017).
My focus on the political economy of the energy transition represents a critical move
away from the long-standing literature on the socio-technical or low-carbon transition
which has been analytical as well as prescriptive in policy terms. Under frameworks of
transitions management, the multi-level perspective and strategic niche management this
literature has dedicated significant exploration to how socio-technical change in systems
such as electricity can happen, including via interactions between ‘niches’, ‘regimes’ and
‘landscapes’(Markard et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Verbong and Geels, 2007). A key
criticism of this literature is that its geographical focus has been informed disproportion-
ately by the experience of countries in Europe and North America. Moreover, it makes
implicit and unquestioned assumptions about the democratic nature of state power, national
infrastructure development, levels of energy access and national capacities for technological
innovation. Such assumptions do not readily apply to contexts of inequality and poverty in
LMICs and political structures shaped by post-colonial path dependencies.
In parallel to scholarship on the political economy of the energy transition, a related
critical body of literature has emerged in recent years from human geography and develop-
ment studies, which broadly speaking can be categorised as ‘energy transitions in the global
South’ (Castán-Broto et al., 2018). This literature puts forward a diversity of socially, cul-
turally, politically and spatially aware analyses from a variety of geographical settings (e.g.
Baptista and Plananska, 2017; Hansen et al., 2018; Osunmuyiwa et al., 2017; Rignall, 2015).
Studies from within this field have also emphasised the significance of the need for any
energy transition to be pro-poor (Ahlborg, 2017; Ockwell and Byrne, 2016), and criticised
the concept of the energy transition in LMICs altogether as a project based on the import of
foreign finance and technologies with little regard for local context (Simmet, 2018).
Meanwhile, notions of the ‘just transition’ that merge the urgent need for a global low-
carbon shift that upholds the norms of socio-economic justice have been put forward by
academia (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Swilling et al., 2016), civil society and trade unions
(PCS, 2016) and some government departments, including in South Africa (National
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Planning Commission, Republic of South Africa, 2019). The essence of any theoretical and
applied understanding of the just transition is that systems of production and consumption
should be reconfigured to avoid resource depletion, environmental degradation and the
perpetuation or creation of socio-economic inequalities. In this way the concept challenges
implicit assumptions that ‘radical green niches’ will be automatically accompanied by socio-
economic co-benefits and seeks to address the livelihood and other socio-economic or envi-
ronmental losses that may accompany any transition to sustainability.
While these recent contributions have given a more critical understanding to the role of
power relations and the distributional complexities of the energy transition, more analysis is
needed in order to understand the significance of capital flows and financial forces in shap-
ing renewable energy pathways. This includes the way in which finance, labour, state-capital
relations, socio-economic welfare and civil conflict may interact with the introduction of
new technological and infrastructural configurations of electricity, particularly in contexts
of high socio-economic and political inequality. Despite the significance of understanding
national processes of decision-making in the electricity sector, including regulation, plan-
ning and procurement, there are evident limits to this nationally bounded focus in an
increasingly financialised and globally interdependent world. Greater exploration is there-
fore needed, of the multi-scalar interactions between rapidly evolving capital flows and
configurations on the one hand and on the other, the embedded nature of electricity
within a specific national and/or sub-national context including systems of law and gover-
nance and socio-cultural structures.
In order to better understand the recent emergence of renewable electricity generation as
a relatively new and rapidly expanding physical and financial asset and a growing commod-
ity within financial markets, I further draw from the literature on financialisation. A liter-
ature which, with its origins in Marxist heterodox economics, is now a well-established
research stream within economic geography (Ioannou and Wojcik, 2019) and development
studies (Bracking, 2016; Mawdsley, 2018). While definitions of financialisation can be
‘rather fluid’ (Furlong, 2019: 574) and subject to a growing and sometimes conflicting
diversity of theoretical and empirical interpretations (Christophers, 2015; Fine, 2013;
Lapavitsas, 2011), an over-cited but useful descriptor is provided by Epstein (2005: 3)
who refers to ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors
and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’.
More recently, Christophers (2015: 187) has summarised it as ‘the growing penetration of
financial logics into our daily life-world, or finance’s increasing dominance of processes and
outcomes of capital accumulation’.
A key feature of financialisation is the proliferation of finance capital and financial
markets in the global economy and many national economies since 1970s, not least in
countries with highly developed capital markets including the US and UK but also many
emerging markets, including Mexico and South Africa (Karwowski and Stockhammer,
2017). At a national level, these developments have resulted in the financial sector taking
up a large or dominant share of GDP as compared to other productive sectors, and the
incorporation of national economies and firms into global circuits of financial capital as an
indicator of economic maturity (Mawdsley, 2018).
Processes of financialisation have resulted in the increasing transformation of physical
objects into speculative assets (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007), including in this case utility-scale
renewable energy projects. As Schmidt and Matthews (2018: 152) elaborate, ‘infrastructure
is a site where financial products (i.e. loans, bonds, securities) meet the material mobilization
of “nature”’. Yet despite the considerable literature on infrastructure financialisation in
general (e.g. Crow-Miller et al., 2017; Furlong, 2019), there are minimal studies to date
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on renewable energy as a new and emerging asset class. In light of this, Castree and
Christophers (2015: 379) have called for analysts and policy-makers to understand how
the financing of new infrastructure in the context of anthropogenic climate change currently
functions, so that it can be shaped ‘to realise important non-economic goals’.
A nascent body of research that responds to this call includes US-centric analyses on the
impatience of venture capital in the clean tech bubble in Silicon Valley in the 2000s and the
subsequent move to ‘software-centric cleantech’ (Knuth, 2018) and the growing influence of
conglomerate ownership on solar PV manufacturers in the 1980s (Jerneck, 2017). Despite
these important contributions there are few studies on the links between renewable energy
and finance in contexts of inequality in LMICs. Exceptions include Harrison and Popke
(2018), who explore how processes of electricity sector liberalisation and procurement mech-
anisms for renewable energy from IPPs in the islands of the Caribbean have created dom-
inant roles for IFIs and new networks of foreign-owned corporations and their
shareholders; Kennedy (2018), who examines the contradictory outcomes of the influx of
foreign investment into Indonesia’s solar PV sector; and Baker (2015a) who in unpacking
the evolving role of finance in South Africa’s renewable energy sector finds a contradiction
between the short-term nature of capital gains and demands for project ‘bankability’ on the
one hand and the unique and potentially progressive requirements for community owner-
ship and economic development on the other.
My analysis makes the following contributions to the literatures discussed above. First,
while recent research has examined the complex nature of project finance for infrastructure
and the multiple cascading contracts it involves (Ashton et al., 2012; O’Neill, 2019) such
research has focussed on high-income economies with limited exploration of its more recent
application to renewable electricity projects more specifically. Second, given that both the
literature on the energy transition and the majority of studies of financialisation are focussed
within national boundaries, there is therefore far greater scope to understand the cross-
boundary nature of financial flows and foreign markets and its interaction with renewable
energy systems (Christophers, 2015). Third, by examining interactions between public and
private sources of finance and the key role of the former in leveraging the latter, I contribute
to research on the shifting nature of development finance in recent decades, following
Mawdsley’s finding of ‘a distinctive acceleration and deepening of the financialisation-
development nexus’ (Mawdsley, 2018: 265). This ‘re-configuration of parts of the
“developing world” as the risky frontiers of profitable investment’ (Mawdsley, 2018: 271),
now sees development finance institutions (DFIs) providing ‘the institutional and material
basis for capital penetration, financialisation, market development and a more orderly set of
practices for the management of risk to capital’ (Carroll and Jarvis, 2014: 535).
Global processes: From liberalisation to financialisation
Procuring renewable energy
Since 2015 investment commitments for renewable energy have exceeded those of conven-
tional energy such as coal and gas. In 2018 global investment in new capacity stood at
$272.9 billion (UNEP/BNEF, 2019: 20) of which developing countries, dominated by China,
India and Brazil, accounted for 54% and China for 33% (UNEP/BNEF, 2019: 22–23).
While in global terms, Latin America (excluding Brazil) and sub-Saharan Africa represent
a relatively small percentage of renewable energy investment and installed capacity to date
(Figure 1(a) and (b)), this paper raises important questions regarding how the growth of
such investment may continue to play out in these regions.
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Unlike large thermal sources of electricity generation which are often financed by public
institutions, and nuclear energy which relies almost entirely on state-backed finance, private
sources provide 90% of global renewable energy investment, of which the majority for solar
PV and onshore wind (IRENA and CPI, 2018: 12). Much of this investment goes to IPPs,
electricity generation projects that are privately developed, constructed, operated and owned
with a dominant proportion of private finance (Eberhard et al., 2016). A significant pro-
portion of this investment has been facilitated by market-based renewable energy auctions,
or tenders with competitive bidding programmes,2 which in the last decade have replaced
state-determined subsidies and feed-in tariffs as the preferred regulatory mechanism for the
procurement of utility-scale, renewable electricity generation (Hochberg and Poudineh,
2018). Between 2005 and 2019 the number of countries implementing renewable energy
auctions grew from six to 100 (IRENA, 2019b) and by 2022 auctions are expected to pro-
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Figure 1. (a) Global installed capacity of wind, 2018. (b) Global installed capacity of solar, 2018. Source:
IRENA (2019a).
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developed in parallel with the privatisation of public sector capital investment and the
internationalisation of investment in large infrastructure.
IPPs and renewable energy auctions have emerged out of long-standing and often ideo-
logically driven shifts over how electricity should be governed. These shifts, sometimes
referred to as the ‘regulatory pendulum’ in electricity governance (Hall et al., 2013), can
be summarised into two opposing positions: between those arguing for a state-owned
monopoly with central planning, and those for a liberalised market with an independent
regulator (Baker et al., 2021). In the case of the latter, a liberalised electricity sector is
perceived as competitive and efficient, and a state-owned one as over-subsidised, resistant
to innovation and subject to the political demands of consumers and interest groups such as
trade unions (Carreon-Rodrıguez et al., 2007; Harraway, 2014). Proponents of liberalisation
tend to assume that markets have a natural ability to facilitate a low-carbon energy tran-
sition through renewable energy IPPs, while a state-owned monopoly will remain controlled
by carbon-intensive incumbents. Those in favour of state-ownership meanwhile see electric-
ity as a public good, with accompanying assumptions that a state-controlled utility will act
in the public interest, while a liberalised market and IPPs will simply prioritise the interests
of corporate elites with limited concern for low-income consumers (NUMSA, 2014).
In the first half of the twentieth century the electricity sector, in countries where it was
established, was generally a state-owned vertically integrated monopoly. But by the 1980s
and 1990s and in keeping with the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy of the time, the ‘standard
model’ of power sector reform had become highly influential across the globe. In developing
countries this model was promoted by the World Bank and related consultants and in turn
endorsed by other multi-lateral lending institutions as part of loan and debt relief condi-
tionalities under structural adjustment programmes. The model, which was informed by the
experiences of a small group of countries including the UK, USA, Norway and Chile,
followed general assumptions that public ownership resulted in poor technical performance
and was unable to meet the high levels of investment required by the electricity sector
(Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). The model’s proponents therefore prescribed the unbun-
dling of state-owned utilities into private transmission, generation and distribution compa-
nies, including a significant role for wholesale markets and ultimately, retail competition
(Sen, 2014).
However following repeated failings of its implementation in developing countries, the
model has been subject to numerous criticisms, including for the generalised assumptions
that it made about the nature of electricity access, state capacity and the national ability to
attract investment, regardless of country context (Eberhard and Godhino, 2017; Sen, 2014).
That said, many principles of liberalisation remain influential. Since then, various forms of
‘hybrid power markets’ have developed, in which vertically integrated, state-owned utilities
remain as the dominant player and the single buyer of electricity but IPPs contribute a
certain amount of generation capacity, selling their output to a government off-taker, often
the utility, or a corporate buyer under a power purchase agreement (Eberhard et al., 2016).
Renewable energy auctions play a key role in these hybrid power markets, including in
South Africa and Mexico as I discuss below.
Auctions follow a market-based framework under which IPPs submit a bid with a price
per unit below a certain tariff cap at which they would sell the electricity generated by their
project to the grid. Auctions are usually held under a series of bidding rounds which set the
total volume of generation capacity that can be awarded. The project that meets the qual-
ifying criteria at the lowest price wins the bid. The nature of these qualifying criteria how-
ever can vary depending on the country or region. For instance, while South Africa’s
auction programme includes criteria for socio-economic development and community
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ownership, Mexico’s is assessed on price alone (see ‘Territorial realities: South Africa and
Mexico’ section). A further variation is that while in South Africa capacity is specified by
technology type, in Mexico it is technology neutral. While auctions in some countries place
restrictions on the volume of projects or MW allocations that can be awarded to individual
companies under each round, others do not. In Mexico for example, the lack of restrictions
has resulted in a small number of large companies being awarded majority control of the
market including Italy’s Enel Green Power, US SunPower, China’s Jinko Solar and Spain’s
Acciona (Yaneva et al., 2018).
The financial and technical principles of auction programmes are now well-documented,
including by industry, regulators and practitioners (cf. Eberhard et al., 2016; Norton Rose
Fulbright., 2017). However, and as evidenced in ‘Territorial realities: South Africa and
Mexico’ section, the financial, contractual and regulatory blueprints currently in circulation
(e.g. Abrams, 2017) have tended to overlook the importance of the socio-economic, political
and cultural context of the locality in which they are operating. Indeed, the significant
challenges that such a context can pose to the implementation of renewable energy auction
programmes and the utility-scale projects they facilitate have often been underestimated by
project developers, regulators and/or governments. Consequently, socio-economic develop-
ment criteria such as those in South Africa can be perceived as an investment risk by
developers for imposing constraints that drive up the cost of capital, reduce profit and
discourage or even deter investment (IRENA, 2017: 38). Moreover, the competitive
nature of auction programmes tends to create huge barriers to entry for smaller players
including community energy companies which are unable to meet the high financial and
transaction costs of participation, such as feasibility studies, qualification arrangements,
deposits or bonds, or to absorb the heavy risks and losses incurred by an unsuccessful bid.
Yet as a result of this competitiveness, a significant decrease in the electricity tariffs
submitted by project bidders has taken place, particularly over the last five years (OECD/
IEA, 2018: 51) and in many countries, Mexico and South Africa included, electricity gen-
erated from wind and solar PV is now on a par with or cheaper than that generated by
conventional technologies such as coal and gas (IRENA, 2018a). These decreasing tariffs
have been assisted by the relatively cheap costs of capital in the last decade due to low global
interest rates, particularly in mature markets (UNEP/BNEF, 2019: 42). The cost of capital is
a significant consideration given that the majority cost of a wind or solar PV project derives
from the upfront expenditure on project construction, unlike thermal and nuclear power
plants of which the costs are spread throughout the project’s operation, including fluctuat-
ing fuel costs.
Financing renewable energy
Project finance emerged in 1980s as a mechanism for long-term, capital-intensive financing
for privately generated electricity generation projects (see Figure 2; Baker, 2015b;
Yescombe, 2013: 9–11). The greatest contribution of project finance now goes to utility-
scale renewable electricity generation which is growing in importance in emerging markets
such as South Africa and Mexico, where what investors deem as ‘supportive policies and
contractual structures that guarantee predictable long-term cash flows’, e.g. auctions, are
now in place (OECD/IEA, 2018: 125). As the OECD/IEA (2018: 120) further explains:
‘project finance is generally used in the case of complex and large projects where the industry
may be relatively less mature, but financiers have a high level of understanding of the
government policy that underpins the business model’.
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The design of renewable energy auction programmes and corresponding structures of
project finance have co-evolved to become increasingly sophisticated, complex and opaque,
in parallel with the evolution of utility-scale renewable energy as a highly competitive indus-
try that favours economies of scale in the supply chain and large global corporate players.
Since 2010 in particular these developments have been accompanied by significant decreases
in the costs of technology and operation and maintenance, and in turn decreased investment
risk and decreased costs of capital. Within the last five years a rapid consolidation of the
global renewable energy industry has taken place with significant corporate mergers and
acquisitions leading to restructuring processes and subsequent job losses (Renewables Now,
2018).
Despite national and regional variations, the global renewable energy market is now
dominated by fewer and bigger developers with strong balance sheets, operating within
highly globalised production networks (Knight, 2018) involving major original equipment
manufacturers and engineering, procurement and construction companies (EPC), such as
Nordex-Acciona, Siemens-Gamesa, Vestas and Goldwind. As the technologies for utility-
scale renewable electricity generation have grown in size and become more efficient, so has
project size, particularly in the case of offshore wind in Europe and China, and onshore
wind and solar PV in emerging markets. Two key examples of the latter include Mexico’s
424MW Reynosa 1 wind farm and 750MW Villanueva solar PV plant (see Table 1). A key
reason for this growth in scale is because larger projects offer higher returns, which lower the
cost of capital and help project developers to negotiate better terms for debt financing
(OECD/IEA, 2018: 52).3
Figure 2. Example of project finance structure for a renewable electricity project. Source: Author’s own.
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As outlined in Figure 2 project finance for renewable electricity generation typically
involves the establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or a limited company, set
up for the sole purpose of developing, operating and owning the project. The nature of this
structure means that risks are allocated among the various consortia involved in the SPV
and are largely held off the balance sheet of the parent companies involved (IEA/OECD,
2018: 119).
As Figure 2 further illustrates, once established the SPV enters into contracts with the
companies or consortia that undertake the EPC and operation and maintenance of the
project, as well as the power purchase agreement with the off-taker, which may be a
state-owned utility or a corporate buyer depending on the national regulatory framework.
In the case of South Africa, the state-owned utility Eskom is the sole off-taker while in
Mexico, projects sell either to the state utility Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) or to
a corporate buyer which must have a nominal ownership in the project, e.g. Spanish utility
Iberdrola and Mexican cement company Cemex (Yaneva et al., 2018). Utility-scale projects
typically have fixed price contracts for their electricity generation via a legally binding power
purchase agreement which lasts for 15 years in Mexico and 20 in South Africa, thereby
generating a long-term, predictable cash flow for investors. The SPV also enters into an
implementation agreement or state-backed guarantee with the host government which guar-
antees payment to the project company in the event of the off-taker default. This sovereign
guarantee is nearly always required by lenders and investors for projects in developing
countries and forms a key part of reducing the project’s investment risk, as discussed below.
Debt financiers, or ‘lenders’, provide finance-based debt on fixed loan terms on the
project’s future cash flow and have no or limited recourse to the liability of the parent
companies involved in the SPV. Debt is often provided by a national commercial bank,
for example Standard Bank in South Africa and Banco Santander in Mexico or a combi-
nation of national commercial banks acting in syndication with each other in larger projects.
Public finance from multilateral, regional, bi-lateral and/or national development finance
institutions (DFIs) and/or export credit agencies (ECAs) may also be involved in the debt
syndicate (see Tables 1 and 2). This public finance may be provided at concessional interest
rates depending on perceived investment risks related to the country, the project and the
technology in question (IRENA and CPI, 2018; see Table 3). Risk mitigation instruments,
for instance from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
may also be included in the debt syndicate in order to help address some of the risks outlined
in Table 3. Lenders are the first to receive financial revenues generated by the project and
are not liable for any losses the project may make. They therefore take a lower level of risk
than equity investors.
The equity shareholding of the SPV refers to the consortium of investors who hold a
share in the ownership of the asset. Typically this consortium includes the renewable energy
project developer(s) who often hold the majority share, and financial investors such as
private equity infrastructure funds. Some concessional finance from a DFI or ECA may
also be present within an equity shareholding depending on the technology, the country and
other conditions. In the case of South Africa and Mexico, key players in the equity share-
holding include major European companies and utilities; national industrial companies;
institutional investors; and dedicated renewable energy investment vehicles (see Tables 1
and 2). Equity investors are the last to receive cash flows generated by the project and are
therefore far more dependent on the project’s success than debt financiers. Because they
carry greater risk, they therefore expect to generate higher returns through the project






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While the financing of a renewable electricity generation project was previously struc-
tured on the basis of a 70:30 debt to equity ratio of the capital cost of the project, it is now
more often structured on an average ratio of 80:20 (OECD/IEA, 2018). In simple terms, the
higher the proportion of debt there is in a project finance arrangement, the lower the aver-
age cost of capital, the lower the tariff and the cheaper the project. In essence, as the
renewable energy sector has matured, so has it become a more viable prospect for developers
and investors.
From renewable energy finance to the financialisation of renewable energy
The role of development finance in facilitating processes of financialisation discussed in the
‘On the energy transition and the role of finance’ section is also evident within project
finance configurations for renewable energy. While in previous decades development finance
was disbursed largely in the form of grants and loans, the nature of this sector is now such
that it operates in partnership with institutions ‘which are themselves increasingly governed
by financial logics’ (Mawdsley, 2018: 267) including SPVs, venture capital, hedge funds,
sovereign wealth funds, credit ratings agencies and global accountancy firms (Sinclair,
2008). While private sources provide 90% of global renewable energy investment
(IRENA and CPI, 2018), public finance plays a very significant role in leveraging and de-
risking this investment, particularly within debt syndicates in project finance (see Figure 2,
Tables 1 and 2). However, the nature of these arrangements varies according to the national
setting. In South Africa for example, development finance has played a much greater role
than the global average, and in some years has been more dominant than sources of private
investment. Development finance in Mexico meanwhile has been more in line with the
global average, standing at 10% of all energy investment in 2018 (Global Climate Scope
Website, 2019).
Table 3. Types of risk in renewable energy project finance.
Political risk Events resulting from actions by the host government that may impact
project revenues, e.g. arbitrary cancellation of permits or licences; failure
of government to honour obligations; politically-related violence such as
protest or civil unrest which may permanently or temporarily disrupt
project operation or construction.
Regulatory risk Any change in the law or regulation that may adversely affect a project, e.g. a
change in the tariff
Counterparty risk Credit and default risk by a counter party, e.g. risk of default by the off-taker
Currency risk Risks associated with volatile foreign exchange rates that can have a negative
impact on the value of investments
Liquidity risk Possibility of operational liquidity issues arising from revenue shortfalls or
mismatches between the timing of cash receipts and payments.
Transmission /grid
connection risk
Risk associated with problems or limitations with the interconnection of
projects, grid management and transmission infrastructure.
Technology risk Risk associated with the use of nascent technology or inexperienced/
unskilled labour involved in deploying it
Resource risk Risk associated with the availability of the resource, e.g. wind speed or direct
normal irradiance in the case of solar PV, and land
Source: Compiled from IRENA (2016: 46), Eberhard et al. (2016).
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Debt from DFIs leverages the participation of commercial banks through grants, con-
cessional and non-concessional loans and risk mitigation instruments, particularly in coun-
tries with a limited track record of renewable energy infrastructure development and where
the investment climate may otherwise deter commercial banks and private investors. In
addition to their mobilisation role in project finance, significant technical assistance has
also been given by bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors for the design and implementation of
policies to promote renewable energy markets, e.g. auction programmes and related regu-
latory reform and fiscal incentives (Baker, 2015b; IRENA and CPI, 2018: 28).
Perceptions and definitions of investment risk (see Table 3) and related commercial pri-
orities for ‘bankability’ hold a fundamental influence over the terms and structures of
project finance, the setting of the cost of capital and the internal rate of return of the project
(IRENA, 2016; Yescombe, 2013). For lenders and investors, the higher the risk the higher
the anticipated return, which inevitably increases the cost of capital. If the cost of capital is
too high, it may become too expensive to borrow and prove prohibitive to the viability of a
project. While investment risks are deemed higher in LMICs than they are in more estab-
lished renewable energy markets such as the US and Europe, so are the returns. Yet rather
than the neutral and technical entity that risk is often presented as by commercial banks,
investors and project developers, its definition and how it is allocated is highly subjective
and contested. There are multiple considerations in defining risk, the emphasis of which can
shift depending on the concerns and priorities of the moment, the technology and national
socio-economic and political conditions (Baker, 2015a). Table 3 summarises common def-
initions of project risk, of which some examples are outlined in the ‘Territorial realities:
South Africa and Mexico’ section.
As the project finance industry has evolved in recent decades, so too has a highly pro-
fessionalised industry of intermediaries such as lawyers and technical advisors who charge
high fees to negotiate the terms of investment risk on behalf of their clients, e.g. the lender,
the shareholders, and the off-taker or the government department responsible for the PPA
or host government agreement as illustrated in Figure 2. As Baker (2015b: 339) surmises,
renewable energy development is ‘conducted by private actors who proliferate behind a
cloak of contractual opacity that encourages extraordinary risk taking’ which helps to
shield principal actors in project finance transactions ‘from the consequences of their
risky behaviour’.
The process of the financialisation of a renewable electricity generation project comes
about through the development of a secondary market, which sees a proportion of the
equity shareholdings and/or debt finance within the SPV being refinanced or on-sold just
before or after project construction. These sales are often to entities such as insurance
companies, pension funds and dedicated infrastructure investment firms for whom the proj-
ect will generate a long-term, stable and predictable cash flow. Following Schmidt and
Matthews (2018: 152), investments in utility-scale renewable energy projects ‘are increasing-
ly entangled with circuits of global finance both as capital is raised and as debts and secu-
rities are traded’. As a result, recent years have seen an explosion in new renewable energy
business models and financing vehicles, including the rise and fall of the YieldCo, defined as
‘a company that owns assets that generate predictable cash flow’ (Varadarajan, 2016) but
which was linked to bankruptcies of the developers SunEdison and Abengoa in 2016, both
of which affected the sustainability of projects in South Africa (Renewables Now, 2018).
With many renewable energy companies, infrastructure investors and investment vehicles
now listed on global stock exchanges, there is also a growing international market for green
bonds which are used to refinance a project after construction, including in South Africa
and Mexico (Ngwenya and Simatele, 2020; Yaneva et al., 2018: 26).
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The nature of this on-selling goes to the tensions at the heart of this research. On the one
hand the finance industry claims that a secondary market frees up capital for further invest-
ment into renewable energy elsewhere (Wroblewska, 2015) and that institutional investors
have a crucial role to play in scaling up renewable energy investment as the largest potential
source of private capital (IRENA, 2016: 12). Yet the opposing view counters that the nature
of this market creates a disconnect between the ownership of the project and the responsi-
bility for it (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006: 75). As Furlong (2019: 574) discusses, ‘while capital
may abandon a set of infrastructures, people-especially low-income people- often cannot’.
In a similar argument Lohmann and Hildyard (2014: 78–79) explain how ‘equity funds
rarely become linked with any given community for more than a few years’, . . . resulting
in ‘the disembedding of capital from specific local commons and its re-embedding in social
and political networks of power located elsewhere’. How these tensions between the inter-
national mobility of renewable electricity capital and the static nature of local commons are
playing out in South Africa and Mexico is now discussed.
Territorial realities: South Africa and Mexico
Both South Africa and Mexico have been shaped by their own unique histories of colonial-
ism and structures of socio-economic, political and spatial inequality. South Africa’s apart-
heid legacy has resulted in severe inequality along racial divisions despite recent attempts at
the redistribution of land and legislation for black economic empowerment (Harvey, 2015),
while a key feature of Mexico’s inequality has been the marginalisation of Indigenous
peoples who hold a strong collective identity and deep cultural relationship to their land
and territory (Avila-Calero, 2017). In Mexico, 70% of Indigenous peoples are poor and
40% of speakers of Indigenous languages live in extreme poverty, lacking access to the basic
services of water, health, education and electricity (CONEVAL, 2016).
Alongside such inequality, both countries are members of the G20 group of the world’s
largest emerging economies and have sophisticated financial markets. South Africa’s
Johannesburg Stock Exchange is the largest and oldest on the continent and Mexico’s
stock exchange, La Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, is Latin America’s second largest after
S~ao Paulo. Both countries are regional leaders in renewable energy deployment in sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean respectively and in recent years
have undertaken complex regulatory reforms of their electricity sectors along the lines
discussed in ‘Procuring renewable energy’ section in order to enable the introduction of
auction programmes for utility-scale renewable electricity and generation by IPPs.
In South Africa these reforms included amendments to the country’s Electricity
Generation Act in order to allow for the introduction of the renewable energy independent
power producers’ programme (RE IPPPP), launched in 2011. Under RE IPPPP, successful
projects sell power to the state-controlled monopoly electricity utility Eskom, which other-
wise continues to dominate generation, transmission and distribution in the country (Baker
et al., 2015). In Mexico, changes were made to the constitution in order to permit the
introduction of the country’s Ley de la Industria Electrica (the Electricity Industry Law)
in 2014 in addition to other relevant laws and amendments, thereby creating a wholesale
electricity market of far greater complexity than South Africa’s.
The outcome of Mexico’s reforms built on earlier though largely unsuccessful attempts to
liberalise the sector initiated in 1992 (Carreon-Rodrıguez et al., 2007). Such attempts how-
ever eventually led to the introduction of a limited number of IPPs, which generated elec-
tricity either for own use or for sale to the CFE. This development was then followed by an
expanding coalition of national and international corporate and financial interests in the
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wind industry in the 2000s, pushing for the remaining barriers to the independent produc-
tion of wind to be removed. Binding targets for renewable energy were introduced in 2008,
and by 2012, 1.2GW of wind farms had been built in the isthmus of Tehuantepec, of which
the majority for self-supply (Boyer and Howe, 2019: chap 2). In 2016 the national auction
programme for the procurement of utility-scale electricity from renewables and other gen-
eration was eventually launched (OECD/IEA, 2017).
Auctions in both countries gained international praise and recognition and facilitated the
involvement of many of the world’s largest renewable energy developers, EPCs and tech-
nology suppliers. While the contribution that renewable electricity from IPPs currently
makes to overall generation capacity in both countries is minimal, it is predicted to increase:
wind and solar PV is set to constitute 14% of Mexico’s generation capacity by 2024 (OECD/
IEA, 2017), and 25% of South Africa’s by 2030 (Department of Energy, Republic of South
Africa, 2018).
By March 2019 South Africa’s RE IPPPP had secured $14.8 billion4 in investment
commitments and procured 6.4GW of generation capacity from 92 utility-scale IPPs
under five bidding rounds (IPP Office, Republic of South Africa, 2019). Yet despite an
unprecedented take off in 2011, RE IPPPP stalled between 2015 and 2018 for reasons
which include political opposition and a refusal by the state-owned monopoly utility
Eskom to sign power purchase agreements of projects awarded under the fourth bidding
round. Eskom justified this move by arguing that it would make a loss from having to
purchase energy from IPPs. The utility’s opposition has been supported by some trade
unions and factions from government and business associated with former president
Jacob Zuma, protesting against what they see as the ‘capitalist capture of renewable
energy’ and arguing that renewable energy will undermine jobs in the coal industry
(Cloete, 2018). It was not until April 2018, following the inauguration of President Cyril
Ramaphosa that the outstanding power purchase agreements were signed.
By comparison, and in part due to the already existing presence of a wind industry in the
country, Mexico’s auction programme developed much more rapidly under three tendering
processes initiated in 2016. The country has now attracted $6 billion of investment commit-
ments for the 5GW of renewable electricity generation procured thus far. By 2017 Mexico
had joined the top 10 countries of renewable energy investment (UNEP/BNEF, 2018: 20)
and the results of its third power auction in 2017 broke records, with average wind contracts
agreed at $18.60 per MWh, and solar at $20.80 per MWh (UNEP/BNEF, 2018: 40). Yet in a
comparable story to South Africa, Mexico’s auction programme has also now stalled due to
political challenges following the voting in of president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of
the centre left National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) in late 2018. In a move
unanticipated by the renewable energy industry and even by some government departments,
in early 2019 Lopez Obrador announced the suspension of the programme and his intention
to hand control of the electricity sector back to the former state-owned utility the Comision
Federal de Electricidad. He justified this move on the basis that private companies were
supplying the market with high costs (Bellini and Zarco, 2019).
This high-level political opposition to utility-scale renewable electricity generation and
privately generated power in both countries comes back to the concept of energy as a site of
struggle and to the ideological debate over whether electricity should be owned and gov-
erned by a state monopoly or a liberalised market discussed in the ‘Procuring renewable
energy’ section. It further serves as an example of political, regulatory and counterparty risk
discussed above. This political struggle has been paralleled by failures to adequately benefit
and include local communities in the vicinity of renewable energy projects in South Africa,
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and in the case of Mexico increased inequalities and violent civil resistance of which the
latter has challenged the viability of the renewable energy projects under development.
Auction design has differed between each country. Under South Africa’s RE IPPPP,
project companies not only have to submit a bid below a set tariff cap at which they will
sell electricity to the state-owned utility Eskom but also demonstrate how the project will
meet certain socio-economic criteria. The evaluation of the bid is allocated 70% on the tariff
and 30% on socio-economic development criteria, with the winning projects meeting the
requirements at the lowest price. These socio-economic criteria include the participation of
black-owned companies in the equity shareholding as part of the country’s black economic
empowerment legislation introduced to address socio-economic marginalisation in the post-
apartheid era. A further requirement is that local communities located within a 50 km radius
of the project must be structured into the equity from a minimum shareholding of 2.5%.
This shareholding is then managed by a legally established community trust, which is
responsible for representing the local community and managing a dividend of about
1.5% of projected revenue (Baker and Wlokas, 2015).
Despite the progressive potential of these criteria, evidence thus far suggests that there
have been a number of flaws in the implementation of the community trusts. First, revenue
will only flow to the community after the project’s debt has been paid off, usually in about
year 15 of project operation (Baker and Wlokas, 2015). In addition, many project trusts
have been established by project developers with minimal or no consultation with the com-
munity concerned. Project companies have also been allowed to dictate local community
empowerment targets to local residents during the bidding process (Nkoana, 2018) but have
then failed to deliver on the targets they set. As the majority of projects are situated in rural
areas with high rates of poverty and unemployment, this has challenged the already limited
planning capacity of municipal and provincial governments (Wlokas, 2015). For this reason,
in many instances poor management of the process has resulted in a ‘tyranny of participa-
tion’, which has reinforced ‘the control of powerful stakeholders over vulnerable commu-
nities’ (Nkoana, 2018).
Conflicts have also taken place within the trusts over how the expected revenue streams
should be allocated and spent within the community (Wlokas et al., 2017). This, in addition
to the problematic process of identifying who qualifies as a community member within the
50 km radius in light of the mobile nature of young residents in particular who migrate to
cities for the purpose of employment (Wlokas et al., 2017). While in some regions there are
multiple IPPs in close proximity which has resulted in overlaps between the 50 km radiuses,
many trusts still operate in isolation from each other (McEwan, 2017). The promise of local
jobs in the vicinity of many of the sites has also created false hope for many community
members given that the majority of the employment potential for unskilled workers for a
wind or solar plant lies in the construction phase of approximately two years. After this,
operation and maintenance depends on only a small core of highly trained specialists who
are generally recruited from elsewhere.
In Mexico by comparison, bids are assessed primarily on the tariff submitted, through a
process that was specifically designed to encourage low prices. As discussed in the
‘Financing renewable energy’ section, projects procured under the auction sell either to
the state utility, the CFE, or from the third bidding round onwards, to a corporate buyer
which must have a nominal ownership in the project. Generators of renewable energy will
also receive clean energy certificates for 20 years which do not expire and can be purchased
and sold, thereby serving as an additional incentive for developers. Unlike in South Africa,
there is no specific requirement for community equity ownership and project developers
have minimal formal responsibility for local community development beyond social and
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environmental impact assessments. In a similar story to that of South Africa, some local
community members have gained employment during project construction but the potential
for permanent work in renewable energy is limited. While the IEA referred to Mexico’s
renewable energy auction as ‘one of the most ambitious, comprehensive, well-developed
reforms undertaken in the world since the 1990s’ (OECD/IEA, 2017: 13), the long-term
social sustainability of the projects has since come under question (Radowitz, 2017; REN21,
2017).
A key reason for this is because utility-scale renewable energy projects in Mexico are
being built disproportionately in Indigenous territories, with high poverty rates and margin-
alisation and where people have centuries-long cultural and spiritual ties to the land.
Notably in the ‘wind corridor’ in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Oaxaca between the
Pacific and the Atlantic oceans covering an area of 1200 km2, and in the states of
Yucatán for solar PV and Puebla for small hydroelectricity (Avila-Calero, 2017; Boyer
and Howe, 2019). There are now 31 wind farms in operation in Oaxaca (Government of
Oaxaca, 2020), the third poorest state in Mexico and in which there has been the greatest
level of civil unrest against utility-scale renewable energy projects. These are projects that
were built before the start of the auction programme, as well as those facilitated by it, many
of which have been developed by a small number of large international companies, or
subsidiaries thereof who have been awarded majority control of the market as discussed
in the ‘‘Procuring renewable energy’ section (Yaneva et al., 2018).
However, the extent to which Indigenous communities have benefited from the projects
to date has been limited and rarely evenly distributed, with notable negative impacts includ-
ing conflicts over land tenure and corruption (Boyer and Howe, 2019). In the case that the
project will affect an Indigenous community, it is the Mexican state that holds responsibility
for gaining the community’s consent (Baker, 2015b). The country’s renewable energy auc-
tion process draws on domestic legislation and international standards on the rights of
Indigenous peoples and in particular the mechanism of ‘free, prior and informed consent’
(FPIC). FPIC, which originates in international human rights law as set out in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), has in recent years
been incorporated into environmental and social lending safeguards of the World Bank’s
private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporate, other DFIs and Equator
Principles Banks. For this reason, DFIs have played an important role in setting up con-
sultations (Baker, 2015b).
Large-scale wind development in Mexico has often been highly divisive and deepened
inequalities. Land tenure reform introduced in 1992 which allowed Indigenous rural com-
munities to sell, rent and subdivide previously communal land served to encourage agri-
business, forestry and more recently the development of large-scale wind farms. For this
reason, Avila-Calero (2017: 993) argues that renewable energy project development has
contributed to ‘the enclosure of communal lands, the private appropriation of benefits,
and the lack of democratic procedures’. Similarly, Baker (2015b: 11) has documented that
subsidiary companies acting on behalf of wind farm developers have put pressure on rural
farmers ‘to sign long-term leases to communally-owned land’, the terms of which have been
highly favourable to the developer at the expense of the lessor. In many cases the affected
farmers are not native speakers of Spanish and, lacking in representation are in no position
to decipher the legal language which make up these contracts. Such contracts have played a
key role in reducing the nature of investment risk discussed above. The nature of land
reform and the contracts that have ensued have also contributed to divisions between com-
munities who own land and have been able to profit from renting it out to the project
Baker 19
developer, and those who do not and are thereby denied opportunity for any socio-
economic gain (Boyer and Howe, 2019).
There has also been resistance against such developments, including community block-
ades and extensive protests, resulting in protracted litigation (Baker, 2015b; Boyer and
Howe, 2019). Dunlap (2018) for instance describes how wind energy developments in the
Isthmus of Tehuantepec have resulted in ‘violent social divisions’ between the police and
demonstrators protesting against the dispossession of land, community, sacred sites and
cultural traditions facilitated by locally recruited private security services. Yet as Avila-
Calero (2017: 1000) explains, the resistance is rarely against wind power per se, but rather
against the way in which it is carried out, or in other words, ‘against land grabbing and its
impacts over local communities’. Such resistance has resulted in construction delays or even
acted as a deterrent to continued project development and serves as a key example of
political risk summarised in Table 3.
As this section has discussed, utility-scale electricity in both countries has been enabled by
procurement mechanisms and financial arrangements that have contributed to existing
relations of inequality and nationally specific pathways of historical marginalisation. The
broader implications of these examples for renewable development elsewhere evokes
Rignall’s (2015: 554) finding that energy transitions ‘are not only about energy, or even
geography, they are about how power infuses the relationships between energy, politics, and
the spatial transformations associated with transition’.
Conclusion
Utility-scale renewable electricity is at once a tool of climate change mitigation, a new and
rapidly expanding infrastructural and technological sector embedded within specific local-
ities, and an emerging asset class that is subject to the priorities and interests of transna-
tional capital. In this paper I have set two key competing objectives of utility-scale
renewable electricity projects in context: as a predictable, long-term revenue stream for
investors, and as a mechanism for socio-economic development and community empower-
ment. In so doing I have unearthed key tensions within the design and implementation of
utility-scale renewable energy procurement programmes in South Africa and Mexico; the
finance and ownership configurations they facilitate; the extent to which the socio-economic
benefits of these new technologies and infrastructures are being distributed to local institu-
tions, communities and individuals; and the conflict and struggles that have ensued. As I
have identified, key tensions exist in the design of auction programmes as the dominant
procurement mechanism for renewable electricity generation, between the competition
involved in winning a successful bid with the cheapest electricity generation possible on
the one hand, and the collaboration required to ensure the realisation of socio-economic
benefits, local acceptance and the inclusion of local stakeholders on the other. With this in
mind I now offer the following four conclusions.
First, this paper has laid the ground for deeper empirical and theoretical research into the
need to think critically about the role of finance in the energy transition. Such thinking
should include how the potentially diverse risks and rewards of utility-scale renewable
energy procurement programmes and the projects they facilitate have been negotiated
and allocated, and the extent to which current structures could be reformed to more equi-
table and sustainable ends. A far greater understanding of the complex and differentiated
configurations of finance and investment that shape the development of associated
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infrastructures and technologies is needed, not least in terms of the implications this has for
local ownership, inclusion and socio-economic development. Further exploration is also
needed into the way in which finance capitalism has been able to transform utility-scale
renewable electricity infrastructure into new and diverse asset classes that can become
increasingly divorced from their impacts at the local level through a growing secondary
market and processes of financialisation.
Second, the co-evolution of renewable energy procurement, structures of finance, and the
growth in size of utility-scale projects and their corresponding technologies is arguably
moving towards an industry of ‘big technology, big infrastructure and big capital’ and a
market dominated by an increasingly consolidated industry. Yet while this research has
focused on the utility-scale, the nature of finance and ownership of emerging models of
decentralised and distributed models of electricity is an important area for future research.
As the cases of South Africa and Mexico have illustrated, while high-level political oppo-
sition and disagreement can play a key role in undermining or at least delaying regulatory
and procurement processes for renewable energy, assumptions of simple binaries between
public and private, and market and state in electricity governance require further unpacking.
Not least, as the nature of project finance in both countries has demonstrated, subsidiaries
of foreign companies from countries in which their own state is the majority shareholder
(e.g. France’s EDF and Italy’s Enel Green Power) operate as private investors in the equity
shareholding of SPVs in renewable energy projects elsewhere. Such shareholders have in
turn benefitted from the leverage provided by development finance institutions, operating
within equity shareholdings.
Third and further to the methodological challenges discussed in the ‘Introduction’ sec-
tion, this research has significant implications for a far more interdisciplinary methodology
for energy transitions research in order to achieve a greater understanding of the reach and
influence of electricity capital between global processes and territorial realities. Such meth-
odology could firstly include detailed quantitative analyses to unpack the national and
international flows of finance involved in renewable electricity generation as an evolving
financial asset, as well as critical policy analysis to further investigate the politics of the
negotiation of electricity regulation and procurement processes that ultimately enable these
assets to develop. But far more can be done to link this elite-level focus with methods from
political ecology and anthropology in order to acquire greater insights into the localised
impacts of renewable energy development. Recent examples of such methods include
Rignall (2015) and Boyer and Howe (2019). In theoretical and methodological terms,
such an approach implies a much more significant dialogue between political economy
and political ecology. Moreover, ethnographic methods, while a significant tool for research
at the community level, could also be used in elite settings in order to elicit a greater
understanding of the operations and priorities of investors, developers and the highly pro-
fessionalised industry of mediators involved in setting and negotiating the terms of risk that
determine who gains and who loses from the energy transition. The involved and long-term
nature of such research cannot be overlooked or underestimated.
Finally, this research raises critical questions regarding the governance and regulation of
finance and electricity at multiple scales and the extent to which capital can disciplined so
that it can be effectively channelled to community empowerment and local socio-economic
outcomes. Following Castree and Christophers (2015: 379), if the financial sector can be
seen as ‘an unelected government whose power is such that it needs to be carefully governed
through a set of endogenous and exogenous norms, rules and institutions’, then it follows
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that auctions are an incentive shaped by governments, technical assistance and investor
interests that enable financiers to craft ‘investment vehicles to help decarbonise the
world’s current infrastructural assets’ (Christophers, 2015: 379). As the examples of South
Africa and Mexico have illustrated, national and sub-national institutions of government,
particularly in LMICs do not always hold the bargaining power, the capacity or the will-
ingness to radically implement and shape these frameworks of renewable energy procure-
ment and conditions of project development in the face of powerful, renewable energy
majors and institutions of transnational capital. This raises the question over how margin-
alised communities can influence and benefit from development that may affect them pro-
foundly and otherwise serve to perpetuate their marginalisation. As the development of
utility-scale renewable energy across the globe continues apace, such questions demand
greater theoretical and empirical prominence in the research on energy transitions.
Highlights
1. Utility-scale renewable electricity generation is essential to decarbonisation yet limited
critical academic thinking has been dedicated its ownership.
2. Despite the pro-environmental outcomes of utility-scale renewable energy, it has often
failed to include or benefit local communities.
3. Electricity is a site of ‘struggle’ between technological change and established configu-
rations of political, social and economic power.
4. Renewable electricity is a rapidly emerging asset class, increasingly determined by the
frameworks and logics of finance and investment
5. Two competing objectives of renewable electricity are a long-term revenue stream for
investors and a mechanism of socio-economic development.
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Notes
1. Here I use UNEP/BNEF’s (2019) categorisation of renewable electricity generation to refer to
onshore and offshore wind, solar, biofuels, biomass and waste, geothermal, hydro-electricity
below 50 MW and marine energy. Hydropower larger than 50 MW is excluded from this catego-
risation. Some calculations of renewable electricity generation however do include hydropower
larger than 50 MW, e.g. IRENA (2019a) which significantly increases the volume of installed
capacity and challenges comparability.
2. The term ‘tender’ refers to the procurement process and the term ‘auction’ to the procedure of
selecting competing bids by price. In practice the terms tenders and auctions are used interchange-
ably (Gephard et al., 2017). A comparable procurement mechanism for utility-scale renewable
electricity, particularly common in the US, involves a PPA that is negotiated directly between a
large electricity consumer and an IPP. Known as a ‘corporate PPA’, the term of contract is usually
shorter than in the case of an auction (OECD/IEA, 2018: 53).
3. This figure is a simplified version. In reality such structures are increasingly complex and may involve
a cascade of related and hybrid instruments such as subordinated debt and political risk insurance.
4. R209.7 billion, at an exchange rate of 0.07 ZAR to $USD.
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